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ABSTRACT
The focus on efficiency costs in the empirical literature on Disability Insurance (DI)
provides a misleading view of the adequacy of payment levels.  In order to evaluate whether
workers are over- or under-insured through the social insurance program, we develop a
framework that allows us to simulate the benefits as well as the costs associated with marginal
changes in payment generosity from a representative cross-sectional sample of the population.
Under the assumption that individuals are reasonably risk averse, our simulations suggest the
typical worker would value increased benefits somewhat above the average costs of providing
them.  However, we find that benefit increases tend to lower average utility when we average
across all individuals in our sample, particularly at high levels of risk aversion.  This
counterintuitive finding arises because some lower income DI-insured workers face replacement
rates that are near or above one.  For such individuals, a benefit increase would represent transfers
from an even lower income state of the world in which they are not on DI to one in which they
are, a transfer that would not be beneficial even if there were no behavioral distortions associated
with the provision of DI benefits.
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1. Introduction 
Disability status is increasingly used as a means for targeting resources in the United States.  
In 1999, 5.6 million disabled individuals and 1.6 million spouses and dependent children 
received a total of $4.2 billion in Disability Insurance (DI) benefits, representing over one-eighth 
of the Social Security budget for benefit payments.  Given its importance and continuing growth, 
an evaluation of whether the DI program provides adequate insurance against the income losses 
associated with the onset of severe limitations is overdue. 
The empirical literature on DI has primarily focused on the impact of program parameters on 
the costs of the program, either in terms of caseload growth or reduced labor force attachment.  
This focus on the efficiency costs of DI provides a misleading view of the social desirability of 
the program itself and of the adequacy of payment levels.  The effectiveness of the program 
depends on how the costs relate to the social gains from redistributing toward individuals and 
states of the world with higher marginal utilities of income.
1  What is striking is that there has 
not been any explicit valuation of the benefits associated with providing DI.
2  In order to provide 
a more comprehensive view, our analysis accounts for both the benefits and costs associated with 
a marginal change in benefit generosity.  While taking this marginal approach allows us to hold 
all else equal and greatly facilitates the analysis, it precludes us from global considerations such 
as optimal program design.  Our goal instead is to determine whether, given the degree of moral 
hazard under the existing DI system, the level of generosity is above or below the optimal level 
and which factors are important to drawing a conclusion. 
How an individual worker fares under this marginal reform depends on the expected change 
                                                 
1 See Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) for an example of a theoretical framework designed to balance redistribution 
goals and labor supply disincentives in determining the optimal level of disability payments. 
2 There is a literature documenting the economic disadvantage of the disabled, but this literature has not posed the 
question in terms of insurance adequacy (e.g., Haveman and Wolfe 1990; Burkhauser, Haveman, and Wolfe 1993).   2
in lifetime utility.  This expectation in turn depends on the impact on the path of family income 
and work effort both in the case where the worker becomes disabled and applies for DI and in the 
case where the worker never applies, and on the likelihood of each of these outcomes.  Our 
approach is based on the intuition that if the population is in steady state, a representative cross-
sectional sample of the population can be thought of as capturing the distribution of potential 
life-cycle paths for a representative individual or cohort.  We can therefore use observed 
earnings patterns to simulate the impact of increasing DI benefits on family income for current 
recipients, potential new applicants, and workers in the sample.  Combining data from the 1991 
March Current Population Survey (CPS) with plausible assumptions about behavioral responses, 
we calculate the expected financial benefits accruing to and financial costs borne by each 
individual in the sample as a result of a one percent increase in DI payments. 
We then conduct the welfare analysis in two stages.  In the first stage, we compare the total 
costs associated with the reform to the increase in transfers to current recipients.  This ratio 
yields an estimate of the average implicit price of providing an additional dollar of income to 
current beneficiaries in the presence of moral hazard.  This price exceeds one only to the extent 
that there are behavioral responses to the increase that generate additional tax and transfer costs, 
including changes in work effort and program participation among current beneficiary and 
potential applicant families.  Using this price, we explore whether representative workers should 
find purchasing additional insurance through reduced take-home pay financially attractive.
3  This 
reveals whether different types of workers are under- or over-insured against career-ending 
disabilities, given the existing level of generosity and degree of moral hazard in the system.  By 
holding the price constant across worker types, we are able to isolate the insurance value of DI. 
                                                 
3 Bird (1996) carries out an analogous analysis for the EITC program, finding that the benefits from reducing 
income risk compare favorably to the tax costs for many middle income individuals.   3
In our second approach, we recognize that like other social insurance programs, the value of 
DI derives from its dual role as a program that both redistributes resources across individuals and 
insures individuals against adverse events.  Thus, for example, for individuals at all levels of 
education, DI acts as privately provided insurance against the reduction in earnings capacity 
associated with the onset of disability.  At the same time, DI redistributes from those with higher 
to those with lower levels of education both because replacement rates are higher for lower 
earners and because the less well educated are substantially more likely to become DI 
beneficiaries.
4  In order to determine the lifetime incidence accounting for the underlying 
distribution of costs and benefits across individuals, we value the change in income for each 
member of our sample.
5  The sum of individual valuations describes whether or not individuals 
gain on average from the payment increase, where this average puts more weight on the low end 
of the income distribution.  The sign of the sum also answers whether a self-interested 
representative individual would favor a payment increase without knowing her own probability 
of disability and pattern of life-cycle earnings, but knowing only the social distribution.
6 
To summarize the findings of our baseline model, we estimate the total cost of providing an 
additional $1 of income to current DI recipients to be $1.50.  While the load factor due to moral 
hazard is fairly high, we demonstrate that it is moderate enough that representative workers 
should be willing to "buy" additional insurance at this price.  However, the average implicit price 
of an additional dollar of insurance is actually much higher than $1.50 for more highly educated 
                                                 
4 Much of the theoretical work in this area relies on static one-period models, with variation across individuals in the 
degree to which they suffer a disability (modeled as the disutility of work).  Productivity differences across 
individuals are assumed away.  In this context, the equity/insurance distinction disappears since everyone is 
identical. 
5 The fact that we are considering a marginal change in program generosity allows us to ignore changes in utility for 
individuals who are induced to apply to the program (which would involve valuing changes in leisure) since these 
individuals are assumed to be indifferent between applying and not applying. 
6 From this perspective of the “veil of ignorance,” redistribution and insurance are not separate concepts (Varian 
1980).   4
workers due to the redistributive nature of the program.  We predict that the reform leads to a net 
welfare loss for these groups regardless of the level of risk aversion, considering only the role of 
own income security.  More surprisingly, despite an average implicit price of less than $1, the 
expected utility gain also turns negative for high school dropouts under high levels of risk 
aversion.  This counterintuitive finding arises since the utility calculation weights low income 
states and individuals more heavily as risk aversion increases, and worker-years with current 
income below the floor provided to DI recipients help to finance the benefit increase.
7 
These combined analyses suggest that DI payments are higher than optimal.  Given the focus 
on moral hazard costs in the empirical literature, we may have expected that workers would be 
over-insured under the current system.  However, what is surprising is that it is not the degree of 
moral hazard that leads to this conclusion.  Rather, what seems to drive this result is that it only 
insures against one kind of income risk.  Benefit increases are to some extent paid for by able-
bodied workers with low incomes and high replacement rates and by disabled workers who do 
not qualify for DI.  This redistribution across various low income states of the world represents a 
hidden cost of any across the board benefit increase and is relevant to other categorical transfer 
programs. 
It is worth highlighting that the conclusion that workers may be over-insured through DI is 
derived in the context of a program that currently has relatively high replacement rates.  Thus, 
the results do not at all imply that the optimal level of DI benefits would be low, merely that they 
would be lower.  A modification to our baseline model that incorporates health insurance 
through its impact on program costs and on utility makes this point even more clear.  New public 
health insurance costs increase the implicit price of additional insurance to $1.66, which does not 
                                                 
7 This result parallels a theoretical result in Diamond and Sheshinski (1995).  The optimal level of disability benefits 
is decreasing in the fraction of non-working individuals who are not on DI, since in their model these individuals   5
affect our conclusions about willingness to pay for typical workers.  However, treating high out-
of-pocket health care expenditures as one of the costs associated with disability exaggerates the 
drop in income at the onset of disability and reduces the effective replacement rate (by 
approximately 8 percent).  This adjustment leads to average utility gains from the marginal 
increase in benefit generosity that increase with the level of risk aversion.  We take this 
sensitivity to small permutations to imply that the generosity of the current program is not too far 
from what would be optimal holding the other program parameters constant. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides background on the 
DI program.  Section 3 develops the conceptual framework we use to evaluate the welfare impact 




DI is currently the most important disability program in terms of its scope and the magnitude 
of expenditures involved.  The program provides benefits to disabled workers (and their spouses 
and children) in amounts related to the disabled worker's former earnings in covered 
employment.  DI benefit payments are calculated in essentially the same way as are retirement 
benefits.  Monthly benefits rise as a function of past earnings, but less than proportionately.  
Funding is provided through a Social Security payroll tax, a portion of which is allocated to a 
separate DI trust fund.   
To be eligible for DI benefits, a worker must have worked a sufficient number of quarters in 
Social Security covered employment.
8  In addition, he or she must not be gainfully employed and 
                                                                                                                                                             
have higher marginal utilities of income and are taxed along with workers to finance the benefit increase. 
8 Roughly speaking, an individual has to have worked in covered employment for 5 of the 10 years prior to the point   6
must pass a medical screening.  The determination of whether an applicant meets the medical 
requirements for disability involves a sequential process, under which about half of all applicants 
are turned down.  Generally, the worker must be found incapable of gainful employment, taking 
into account age, education and work experience.  The person must be disabled for a five-month 
waiting period before he or she can receive benefits.  Given continuing restrictions on work, the 
vast majority of recipients refrain from working at all.  After two years on the program, 
beneficiaries become eligible for Medicare.  Successful applicants can expect to continue to 
receive cash and health benefits for the remainder of their lives.  At the age of 65, beneficiaries 
are officially transferred from the disability to the retirement program, but their retirement 
benefits are equivalent to the benefits they received under the disability program.  
The fact that DI is targeted to eligible workers distinguishes DI from the second most 
prominent disability program—Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  While DI is essentially an 
early retirement program, SSI is a means-tested program providing benefits to needy disabled 
and blind as well as needy aged individuals, regardless of work history.  The two programs serve 
somewhat different populations.  The typical DI beneficiary tends to be older and is less likely to 
be female, a high school graduate, or white than is a typical member of the working aged 
population.  The SSI population is somewhat younger and more female than the DI population 
and is even less well educated.  We focus our attention on the DI program because it functions 
more directly as an insurance program. 
The case for mandatory public insurance for career-ending disabilities is relatively strong.  
First, given that these types of disabilities represent very low probability events, it is inefficient 
for individuals to self-insure through own savings.  Second, in the absence of government 
intervention, adverse selection would likely prohibit a market for comprehensive long-term 
                                                                                                                                                             
in time the worker becomes disabled.   7
disability insurance from forming.  Firms offering private disability insurance would attract those 
individuals with the highest risk of becoming disabled.  At any given price, this form of 
consumer self-selection may prevent insurance companies from breaking even.  The government 
can overcome problems of adverse selection by requiring participation, so that low-risk 
individuals are forced to pool with high-risk individuals.  While supplementary private insurance 
packages are currently available to some classes of workers,
 9 this market presumably owes its 
existence partly to the primary insurance offered by DI.  In fact, the early private insurance 
market established before the public system was introduced collapsed during the Great 
Depression and was eventually resurrected with more limited coverage (U.S. Senate 1955). 
Though public insurance can solve adverse selection problems, DI is not necessarily any more 
immune to moral hazard than private programs.  The striking historical correlation between 
trends in DI participation and reduced labor supply among elderly males has led to a large 
literature measuring the disincentive effects of DI.  Though the empirical evidence suggests that 
the typical DI beneficiary would be out of the labor force regardless, the same is not true of 
individuals on the margin who are induced to apply by increases in the availability and 
generosity of benefits (Bound and Waidmann 1992, 2002; Autor and Duggan, forthcoming).  
Though DI is associated with large behavioral distortions, there is little in the literature that 
would permit one to say whether these sizeable effects outweigh or are outweighed by the 
benefits of the program.
10 
 
                                                 
9 Levy (2002) finds that 43% of workers have long-term disability insurance through their employers.  However, 
coverage rates are much higher among those in the top quintile of hourly wages (72%) than for those in the bottom 
quintile (13%) who are at the greatest risk of becoming permanently disabled. 
10 A notable exception is Gruber’s (1996) analysis of a discrete change in benefit generosity in Canada that 
concludes with a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the net utility benefits to current beneficiaries, marginal 
applicants, and workers.   8
3. Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Determining whether typical workers gain 
The goal of the first phase of our analysis is to establish whether representative workers 
should be willing to trade reduced take-home pay for increased DI benefits, given the degree of 
actuarial unfairness associated with the program.  The program is actuarially unfair on average 
because of moral hazard.  That is, since higher benefits lead to behavioral responses that increase 
the cost beyond the amount that is actually transferred to current recipients, it will cost more than 
$1 to increase the income of the disabled by $1.  However, workers may still want to purchase 
additional insurance at this price if the marginal utility of income is high enough in the disabled 
states of the world. The value of additional insurance to workers depends on how important own 
earnings are to family income and the rate at which DI replaces lost earnings, as well as the level 
of risk aversion. 
The experiment that we consider is a one percent increase in DI payments.  This experiment is 
clearly artificial since we leave retirement benefits unchanged despite how closely the two 
programs are linked.
11  It is not meant to capture a realistic policy but provides a concrete way 
for us to evaluate how individuals value DI at the margin.  Given the marginal policy change, we 
first calculate the static costs due to the increase in transfers to DI beneficiaries holding behavior 
constant.  Then, we add the dynamic tax and transfer costs associated with the behavioral 
responses of current beneficiaries as well as other individuals to the payment increase.  From this 
point forward, we refer to the static costs as "direct" costs and the dynamic costs as "indirect 
costs."  The average implicit price of providing an additional dollar to current DI recipients is 
simply the ratio of total to direct costs. 
                                                 
11 Note that we do account for increases in payments to elderly that were DI recipients prior to aging into the 
retirement program.   9
While calculating these costs may seem straightforward, consider the difficulties that arise 
when determining even the direct increase in DI payments to current beneficiaries.  Individuals 
who enter the program when they are 35 continue to receive benefits from then on.  We would, 
therefore, need to project benefits forward to determine the full cost.
12  We greatly simplify our 
task by making the following steady state assumption.  As long as the overall population and the 
fraction receiving DI are not growing, the age distributions of both the overall population and of 
DI recipients are not changing, and there is no productivity growth, we can measure the costs 
from a random sample of the population.  Each individual in the cross-section can be 
conceptualized as depicting the circumstances at one age within a possible life cycle path for an 
individual.  Then, payments to 45-year olds on the program today can be thought of as picking 
up the payments to 35-year olds ten years hence.  While this steady state assumption may not be 
particularly realistic in the context of the current age structure in the United States, as we discuss 
later, sensitivity tests suggest that maintaining this assumption does not substantially affect our 
results. 
To measure the direct costs, we identify current recipients in our sample and increase family 
benefits by one percent.  Note that beneficiaries are found among the elderly as well as the 
working-aged population since our framework views an elderly person as the aged version of a 
working aged individual.  In order to identify the full impact of the reform, we need to identify 
which elderly individuals would have been DI beneficiaries in their working years.  Appendix A 
describes how we identify beneficiaries and how we determine the baseline level of family DI 
payments. 
The resulting change in public transfers to these families is moderated by mechanical 
                                                 
12 Longitudinal Social Security records that track individual earnings and benefits over time might appear to solve 
the informational problem.  However, these records do not provide information on family income amounts and   10
interactions with other programs.  We use payment algorithms to reduce cash SSI and in-kind 
Food Stamp amounts received.
13  Finally, the resulting net increase in income will lead to higher 
income taxes paid by current beneficiaries.  We use TAXSIM to estimate the change in federal 
and state income taxes paid.
14  The total direct costs of the reform are, therefore, the increase in 
DI benefits paid less any reduction in other transfers and any increases in taxes paid, summed 
across families.  This sum represents the net additional public outlay to families with current 
beneficiaries, as well as the net increase in income for these families. 
We use this same steady state framework to calculate two sets of indirect costs.  First, we 
allow current beneficiaries and their families to respond to the lump sum increase in income.  
Own labor supply has little room to respond given the restriction on gainful work imposed by DI, 
although family labor supply responses could potentially be sizeable (Cullen and Gruber 2000).  
Any reduction in labor supply represents a program cost since it will result in reduced income 
and payroll taxes paid by the family.  Relying on the broad thrust of the literature on the long run 
income elasticity of labor supply (see Killingsworth 1983), we assume that husbands of current 
beneficiaries continue to earn the same as before, but apply an income elasticity of negative one 
to wives of current beneficiaries.  After calculating the reduction in spousal earnings, we 
estimate the associated tax cost. 
The second set of indirect costs that we consider has been emphasized in the prior literature 
on DI—those associated with new applications.  The magnitude of these costs will depend on the 
number of new DI applicants, as well as how many of these new applicants pass the medical 
                                                                                                                                                             
sources over time that is integral to our calculations. 
13 For those low-income recipients who are currently receiving SSI benefits, the net change in transfers will actually 
be zero since SSI benefits are reduced one-for-one with DI benefits. 
14 TAXSIM is the National Bureau of Economic Research’s FORTRAN program for calculating liabilities under the 
U.S. federal and state income tax laws from individual data.  We use version 4.0 available at URL 
(http://www.nber.org/taxsim/).  For more information about TAXSIM, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993).   11
screening.  Successful new applicants will receive DI payments.
15  Further, changes in the 
income and labor supply of successful and unsuccessful applicants and their families may lead to 
increased participation in other transfer programs as well as lower tax payments.  The costs of 
the policy change include not only the DI benefit payments to new successful applicants, but also 
increased public transfers and reduced tax revenue associated with successful and unsuccessful 
applications. 
We rely on evidence from prior literature to predict how many new applicants and 
beneficiaries will result from the policy reform.  Although estimates of the elasticity of 
applications with respect to benefit generosity vary considerably (Bound and Burkhauser 1999), 
plausible bounds exist.  The estimates we find the most credible are based on time series 
evidence from the 1960s and 1970s, a period of time when replacement ratios rose appreciably 
(Halpern 1979; Lando, Coate and Kraus 1979).  These estimates suggest elasticities in the 
neighborhood of 0.5.
16 
We need to link the application elasticity to the size of the current pool of recipients.  
Historically, roughly half of those who apply for DI are awarded benefits (Bound and 
Burkhauser 1999), which would imply a ratio of ever-applicants to beneficiaries of two.  The 
ratio will be greater than this estimate to the extent that mortality is higher among successful than 
unsuccessful applicants, and will be smaller to the extent that many individuals apply several 
times.  Using the matched SIPP-SSA data described in Appendix B, we are able to estimate the 
ratio directly for individuals included in the SIPP panels whose applications were acted upon 
                                                 
15 Since we are analyzing a marginal change and these individuals are assumed to be just indifferent between 
applying or not, we can ignore the value of these payments and account for them solely on the cost side.  That is, 
they affect only the numerator and not the denominator of the implicit price. 
16 Cross-sectional estimates vary considerably, from a low of 0.2 to a high of 1.3.  Kreider (1999), with the most 
credible econometric model, estimates an elasticity of 0.8.  See Bound and Burkauser (1999) for a review of this 
literature.    12
between 1977 and 1997 and find that the two effects largely cancel.  Therefore, we assume that 
the steady state number of applicants is approximately twice as large as the recipiency base.  
This implies that the elasticity of beneficiaries with respect to benefits is the same as the 
application elasticity.
17 
Thus, our baseline assumption is that a 1% increase in benefits leads to a 0.5% increase in 
applications, and the same percentage increase in beneficiaries.  Marginal applicants are assumed 
to be observably similar to current DI beneficiaries.  We describe in Appendix A how we 
identify new unsuccessful and successful applicants in our sample and assign DI family 
payments to them. 
We conduct detailed analyses with matched SIPP and SSA data to guide the assumptions that 
we make about the behavioral responses of marginal applicants and their families.  Our 
methodology allows us to trace out the impact of both successful and unsuccessful applications.  
The most important behavioral responses are changes in own labor supply, which then lead to 
additional costs associated with increases in transfer payments and decreases in tax payments.  
Details on how we determine which behavioral responses are relevant and estimate the 
associated costs are provided in Appendix B. 
Though we account for the most obvious behavioral responses, we ignore several classes—
some of which we expect to have a negligible impact on our calculation and others that are 
potentially important but about which we can do little.  We ignore the deadweight burden 
associated with raising taxes to pay for the increased DI payments.  Empirical evidence (Gruber 
1994; Anderson and Meyer 1995) suggests that payroll taxes that support programs that are 
                                                 
17 It seems likely that those induced to apply by an increase in benefits would tend to be less severely impaired than 
the typical applicant.  In this case, they would be less likely to pass the screening.  Since unsuccessful applicants 
cost less in terms of taxes and transfers than do successful applicants, our assumption should lead to an overestimate 
of the costs of a payment increase.   13
restricted to workers are essentially benefit taxes, so that the deadweight burden of the tax 
increase will be negligible.  However, as we demonstrate, DI is far from a pure benefit tax since 
it involves substantial redistribution across worker types.  Easy solutions to account for 
deadweight loss, such as scaling the tax costs upward using factors estimated in the literature, 
will not work in this case, since some individuals receive subsidies and others are taxed.  
Ignoring this cost is equivalent to assuming the net burden is zero. 
We also ignore a variety of other responses to changes in DI benefit generosity, such as 
changes in savings, marriage rates, or participation in private disability insurance programs.  We 
suspect that none of these effects is likely to be large.  The occurrence of a long-term disability 
during a person's working years is a relatively rare event, but is likely to represent a reasonably 
permanent state.  Though both savings and marriage significantly mitigate the costs of becoming 
disabled, neither form of self-insurance against this eventuality is very effective.  For this reason, 
neither is likely to be heavily used or to respond to changes in benefit levels.
18  Though 
apparently a more viable alternative, applicants for DI are not typically covered by any type of 
private disability program, leaving little room for crowd-out along this margin.
19 
Using our estimates of the costs that we are able to measure, we then calculate the ratio of 
total to direct costs.  In order to determine whether a representative individual would be willing 
to purchase additional insurance at the implied price, we need to determine the relative value of 
income to an individual across able-bodied and disabled states of the world.  We assume a utility 
function that exhibits constant relative risk aversion, and is separable in consumption and leisure: 
1
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18 Moreover, median savings among those who apply for DI benefits in the matched SIPP-SSA sample are only 
$600. 
19 Only 8.5% of DI recipients in the March 1991 CPS report receiving private disability insurance.  Those who   14
where C is consumption, H represents hours worked, and θ  is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion.
20  Given this utility function, the marginal utility of income is C
θ − .  The relative value 









, where  d C  represents 
consumption when disabled and  nd C  represents consumption when able-bodied.  We rely on 
matched SIPP and earnings records (SER) data to estimate the relative consumption levels for 
DI-insured individuals.  Then, we compare willingness to pay calculated at varying levels of risk 
aversion to the average implicit price. 
3.2 Determining whether workers benefit on average 
Given our estimates of the direct and indirect costs, the distribution of these costs across 
workers determines how the average worker fares.  While DI transfers resources from younger to 
older individuals and from able-bodied to disabled individuals in the cross-section, from our 
steady-state perspective DI transfers resources from earlier to later years and across different 
states of the world.  If the cross-sectional distribution captures the full distribution of potential 
life-cycle paths, then the net benefits to the random sample measure the average life-cycle 
incidence. 
Our approach is to first simulate the change in utility following the reform for each individual 
in our sample, and then to aggregate across all individuals.  To clarify our approach, it is helpful 
to decompose the sum of utilities in the following way: 
                                                                                                                                                             
receive private benefits tend to have more years of education than those who do not (12.5 vs. 10.3). 
20 What is important is not the specific functional form, but the implication that individuals value $1 more when they 
are poorer than when they are richer, and that these relative values do not vary with hours of work.  We use this as a 
heuristic for determining the marginal value of income across states.   15
() () () () ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt i jt
ijt ijt ij t
ijt ijt








,            ( 2 )  
where i indicates individual, j indicates possible realizations (e.g. disabled or not), and t indicates 
the time period or age.  Each member of our sample can be conceptualized as representing a 
point in time on one possible life path for an individual.  Imagine all of the observations 
representing a given individual's possibilities, and imagine that individual at some base period 
early in her life.  Also, focus on the financial component of utility.  As we justify more fully 
below, this is reasonable for our analysis since we do not have to explicitly value changes in 
leisure for the marginal applicants who are assumed to neither gain nor lose from the reform and 
since the changes in work effort for families of beneficiaries operate through income effects.
21  





 for these observations can be thought of as that person's report of 
how she values the change in consumption in time period t and state j caused by the reform.  The 
sign of the sum across j and t describes whether she directly benefits from the reform or not.
22  
Subsequently aggregating across different persons weights their net valuations by the relative 
marginal values of income at the base period. 
While conceptually we can separate individuals and life paths, it is impossible to do so in our 
cross-section.  The role of the risk aversion parameter is complicated in this setting.  From the 
perspective of a given individual, the utility gain from reducing the potential income loss from 
the onset of disability depends on the level of risk aversion in the traditional manner.  A higher 
                                                 
21 Note that we ignore any deadweight burden associated with changes in tax payments required to finance the 
reform that would involve changes in work effort for worker families. 
22 While this approach implicitly discounts by mortality, it assumes individuals do not otherwise discount the future.  
We make this assumption based on survey evidence (Barsky et al. 1997) that suggests time discounting is negligible.  
We did, however, check the robustness of our results.  In qualitative terms, our results hold for any reasonable 
discount values.     16
level of risk aversion increases the weight on low income periods, making insurance more 
desirable.  But, in the welfare calculation, a higher level of risk aversion also increases the 
weight that low income individuals receive.  The social net benefit of the reform will vary with 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion through both of these channels, so that inequality-
aversion and risk-aversion effects are entangled. 
We derive the individual-, realization-, and period-specific components of equation (2) by 
simulating the point in time change in utility for each person in our CPS sample.  We begin by 
distributing the costs of the increase in DI benefit generosity according to 1990 funding patterns.  
That is, increases in DI benefit payments and decreases in payroll taxes paid are shared across 
workers in proportion to earnings below the Social Security maximum.  Net tax costs due to lost 
income tax revenue and increases in other transfers are distributed according to workers' shares 
of federal and state income taxes paid.
23  We can then simulate the impact of the reform on 
family income for current beneficiaries, potential new applicants, and workers.  In this case, how 
workers are affected by increasing DI generosity depends on both the progressivity of DI 
replacement rates and of the tax code.
24  The degree to which the increased insurance is 
actuarially unfair is folded into the analysis since the predicted shifts in family income absorb the 
tax increases due to direct and indirect financial costs. 
The next step is to translate the changes in income and leisure into changes in utility.  
Assuming that utility takes the form described above, we are able to focus exclusively on the 
                                                 
23 AFDC costs are divided between the state and federal tax bases according to the 1990 AFDC cost sharing 
formulas. 
24 While the above method of distributing costs is the most immediately policy-relevant approach, a second method 
would instead distribute the net costs across workers in proportion to expected net benefits.  Expected net benefits 
would be based on a worker's age-adjusted position in the earnings distribution and would require information on 
the pre-application position of DI applicants.  This would have the advantage of more effectively isolating the 
insurance value of increased benefit generosity because the degree to which the policy change is actuarially unfair 
(e.g. expected financial payments exceed expected benefit receipts) reflects only the relative magnitude of the costs 
arising from moral hazard.   17
financial component.  The only changes in leisure considered in our analysis are among families 
of current beneficiaries and marginal applicants.  For the families of current beneficiaries, the 
increase in transfers (net their share of costs) is valued ignoring any changes in spousal earnings 
and leisure.  Though these families choose to "spend" some of the increase in income on 
increased leisure, the marginal utility gain can be captured through the income effect.  While the 
direct benefits accrue to those already on DI through the increase in income, indirect benefits 
accrue to the individuals induced to apply for DI benefits.  However, since these individuals are 
at the margin, revealed preference suggests that they will gain relatively little from the increase.  
Thus, we assume that the change in utility for marginal applicants is zero.
25  Other families 
experience only a change in income proportional to their share of costs. 
Finally, we need to specify how changes in family income are converted to changes in 
individual consumption.  One alternative is to simply proxy for consumption using per capita 
family income.  However, there is evidence that families are capable of buffering themselves 
against short-term fluctuations in income.  Therefore, we also use an alternative proxy to account 
explicitly for divergence between income and consumption due to saving.  We use data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to calculate the relationship between concurrent family 
income and consumption, and then smooth family income accordingly.
26  In addition, for both 
smoothed and unsmoothed family income, we calculate both a strict per capita measure and a per 
capita equivalency.  In the equivalency measure, family income is divided by a factor that 
accounts for both differences in consumption between children and adults and economies of 
                                                 
25 Note that marginal applicants’ indifference is from the point of the health shock onward (as in Diamond and 
Mirrlees 1978).  To the extent that the aggregate demand curve for DI benefits is not smooth and continuous in the 
level of generosity, then we ignore a non-zero gain to this group and thus underestimate the benefits associated with 
increasing DI payment generosity. 
26 The methodology is described in detail in Appendix C.  Note that our approach does not allow for perfect 
smoothing of consumption across high and low income periods, so that the marginal utility of income is falling with 
income for individuals.   18
scale.
27 
The estimated changes in consumption are then fed through the utility function to calculate 
ijt dU for each CPS sample member.  The sum of the net gains in utility determines the social 
value of increasing DI payments.  The same calculation for workers with given characteristics 
determines the value of the policy change to subsets of individuals.  We present results at both 
low and high levels of risk aversion in order to test the sensitivity of our findings. 
3.3 The Role of Health Insurance 
Up until this point we have ignored the role that medical insurance plays in both welfare 
analyses.  For the first analysis, if potential applicants become newly eligible for public health 
insurance programs, the total costs of the reform may increase.  Though determining this net 
fiscal externality is very difficult, we choose an approach that provides a clear upper bound on 
the new public health insurance costs associated with marginal applicants.  We assume that all 
individuals that were not receiving public insurance prior to applying but then shift to public 
insurance generate net new health care costs.  Details are provided in Appendix B.  The new 
Medicare costs are distributed across families according to their share of earnings subject to the 
Medicare tax.  The new Medicaid costs are divided between federal and state tax bases according 
to the cost-sharing formulas, and are then distributed across the population according to shares of 
federal and state income taxes paid. 
The role that health insurance plays in the second welfare analysis is much more complicated.  
Valuing medical insurance for marginal applicants, albeit implicitly since we continue to assume 
they are just indifferent between applying and not applying, requires valuing medical insurance 
for the working population as well in order to determine baseline utility.  The relevant value is 
                                                 
27 We use the adjustment factor suggested by Citro and Michael (1995): (Na + .8*Nc) 
0.7, where Na is the number of   19
not the dollar value of benefits but the insurance value.  Imagine that insurance status has little 
effect on what kind of medical procedures one has, but affects only the out-of-pocket costs.  
Then, the cost of being uninsured is the possibility of having to pay large medical bills and can 
be modeled as a loss of income.  We estimate heterogeneity in the exposure to distributions of 
out-of-pocket expenditures for families by age of the head and type of insurance coverage using 
empirical distributions in the CEX (see Appendix D).  We then randomly reduce after-tax 
income by a draw from the appropriate distribution before proceeding. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The random sample of the population that serves as the basis for our analysis comes from the 
March 1991 Current Population Survey (with income data for calendar year 1990).  Our sample 
consists of 158,318 individuals residing in 73,638 tax-filing units.
28  We take both the size of the 
disability population and the implementation of the program (e.g. screening stringency) as given 
when evaluating the desirability of increasing benefit generosity.  Since 1990 predates the recent 
surge in program growth,
29 we tested to ensure that the results are robust to inflating the DI 
population to current levels.
30  Another issue immediately arises with our assumption that the 
population is in steady state.  The hump-shaped age distribution we observe in the CPS is not 
consistent with a feasible steady state.  That is, the fraction of the population that falls within 
each age category has to be monotonically declining, or at least non-increasing.  The results are 
robust to re-weighting the sample assuming constant fertility and mortality weights to 
                                                                                                                                                             
adults and Nc is the number of children. 
28 Our definition of tax-filing units essentially matches the CPS definitions of subfamilies, except that adult 
unmarried children residing with their parents are considered to be their own tax-filing units. 
29 See Stapleton et al (1998) for a discussion of the various factors behind this recent growth. 
30 As expected, inflating the size of the DI population to current levels increases the implicit price of insurance, but 
only from $1.50 to $1.51.  It has no qualitative impact on the welfare implications of the policy reform.   20
approximate a feasible steady state distribution.
31 
4.1 Direct and Indirect Costs of the Reform 
We have divided the costs associated with the increase in DI payment generosity into two 
main categories.  Direct (static) costs result from the transfer of additional income to current 
beneficiaries, and involve no behavioral response.  Indirect (dynamic) tax and transfer costs are 
generated by the behavioral responses of individuals to the regime change.  Our estimates of the 
costs by category are shown in Table 1. 
The first components of direct costs are calculated by scaling family payments for current 
working aged and elderly DI beneficiaries to reflect the 1% increase in generosity.  For worker 
beneficiaries, this generates direct costs of $191.1 million.  For elderly beneficiaries, we have 
taken into account both the probability the individual was a DI worker beneficiary and whether 
the individual generates benefits based on own work history.
32  The expected direct cost of 
increased payments to elderly beneficiaries is $129.6 million.  These increases in DI payments 
are mechanically offset by the interaction of the DI program with other transfer programs, 
leading to costs savings of $29.8 million.  Finally, these families owe additional federal and state 
taxes, leading to savings of $4.6 million in federal and state income taxes.  The sum of these 
components is the net new transfer to current DI recipients assuming no behavioral response, and 
totals $286.3 million. 
We account for two main types of indirect costs generated by the behavioral responses to the 
regime change.  First, we account for spousal labor supply responses to the increase in transfers 
to current beneficiaries.  These responses reduce the amount of taxes owed by families of 
                                                 
31 The implicit price of an additional dollar of insurance falls slightly, from $1.50 to $1.42, and there is no 
qualitative effect on the welfare implications. 
32 If the individual currently receives a Social Security benefit amount determined by a retired or deceased spouse's 
benefit eligibility, the reform will have no impact on SSDI payments or on family income.   21
beneficiaries, leading to a loss of $2.2 million in federal, state, and payroll tax collections. 
The second set of indirect costs is generated by the response of those individuals induced to 
apply by the policy change.  The most important of these are due to the new DI payments to 
successful applicants.  The total simulated cost of these new DI payments is $89.7 million, which 
is about one-fourth as large as the direct cost of increased payments to existing beneficiaries.
33 
The remaining indirect costs associated with marginal applications are due to reductions in 
own labor supply and resulting changes in public transfers and taxes.  To calculate these, we take 
into account the likelihood of successful and unsuccessful applications, and the likelihood that 
rejected applicants return to work.  The resulting income and payroll tax costs total $50.9 
million.  We predict savings of $0.5 million on AFDC payments, since few marginal applicants 
receive AFDC in the base case, few become eligible as unsuccessful applicants, and most 
successful applicants become ineligible.  Costs associated with the Food Stamp Program are $0.4 
million, driven partially by less restrictive income limits for disabled individuals.  Finally, SSI 
benefits to new successful applicants add $0.3 million to the costs of the policy change.  The 
costs generated by behavioral responses to the regime change total $143.0 million. 
The relative magnitudes of the various costs provide some insights into which of the 
maintained assumptions are likely to qualitatively affect our results.  Altering our assumptions 
about the spousal labor supply response for current beneficiaries would clearly have very little 
effect.  While we are fairly confident that we have accurately captured the impact of application 
to DI on behavior, we are less certain about how accurately we have captured the number of new 
applications that would result from a marginal increase in generosity.  A larger or smaller receipt 
                                                 
33 As a plausibility test, we compare the indirect DI payment cost for working aged individuals to an alternative 
crude calculation.  Indirect payments should be approximately equal to total payments to current working aged 
beneficiaries multiplied by 0.005 (the 1% benefit increase times the application elasticity).  The ratio between the 
amount resulting from our more involved calculation and this amount is 0.94.   22
elasticity would scale the indirect costs approximately proportionately, which highlights the key 
role that this form of moral hazard plays in determining whether payments are currently too high 
or too low.
34 
4.2 Representative Workers' Willingness-to-Pay 
Our calculations of total direct and indirect costs yield an estimate of the average degree of 
actuarial unfairness associated with the "purchase" of an additional dollar of DI benefits through 
reduced income for non-recipients.  The ratio of total costs to the direct costs, which capture the 
net transfer to current DI recipients, is equal to 1.50.  For every $1 of income transferred to 
current recipients, an additional 50 cents are incurred in indirect costs. 
We use our estimate of the average implicit price to calculate whether representative 
individuals should be willing to pay for increased benefits.  These calculations are presented in 
Table 2.  The medians shown are calculated from the subset of the 1990-93 SIPP sample that is 
aged 45-61 and is eligible for DI.  Assume that when a person becomes disabled, own earnings 
are lost and they are replaced to some extent by DI benefits.  Then, the value of additional 
insurance will be greater the more important own earnings are to family income and the lower is 
the share of earnings replaced by DI.  The first two columns in Table 2 present the share of own 
earnings in household income and the ratio of projected family DI payments to own earnings by 
gender and educational attainment.  While there are no clear patterns in own earnings share by 
education, the progressivity of the payment schedule generates a sharp decline with education in 
the share of own earnings replaced.  It is not surprising, then, that the pre- and post-tax 
replacement rates for family income shown in the next two columns also decline sharply with 
education. 
                                                 
34 For example, with an application elasticity of 0.8 (Kreider 1999), the indirect and total costs would be roughly 
60% and 20% higher, respectively, than those we estimate.     23
  As discussed in the prior section, given a separable constant relative risk aversion utility 
function, the relative value of a dollar in the two states can be expressed by the ratio of income in 
the two states raised to the power of the negative relative risk aversion parameter.  This measure 
of willingness to pay, based on after-tax family income replacement rates, is reported in columns 
5-7 for levels of risk aversion equal to one, two, and four respectively.  Because of the higher 
drop in family income between able-bodied and disabled states, willingness to pay is higher for 
more highly educated groups.  Similarly, willingness to pay is higher for men than women, since 
the share of women's earnings in family income is lower.  While DI-eligible men of all education 
levels would find purchasing additional insurance at a price of $1.50 attractive at levels of risk 
aversion at or above two, the same holds for all eligible females only at levels above two.  
Though based on a somewhat older population, recent survey evidence finds mean levels of risk 
aversion slightly above four (Barsky et al. 1997).  At this level, all of our representative 
individuals would be willing to purchase an additional $1 of insurance at a price of $1.50.  This 
implies that if the reform could be financed so that individuals were to absorb the costs in 
proportion to their share of expected payments, an increase in DI benefits would move the level 
closer to the optimal level.  Given replacement rates of between 0.7 and 0.8 for the typical 
worker, this result emphasizes the substantial value individuals put on the insurance DI provides.  
Now, we consider the fact that different individuals must pay different prices for increased 
insurance given the redistribution within the program.  Rather than relating overall direct costs to 
total costs, we consider how these costs are distributed across individuals with higher and lower 
levels of education.  Table 3 shows the average share of costs borne by families according to 
years of education of the family head.  The majority of costs are distributed in proportion to 
earnings under the payroll tax cap.  The least-educated families pay $1.52 in total costs   24
(annually) and the most educated pay $5.88 on average through reduced take-home pay.  The 
resulting distribution of costs is mildly progressive, as shown in the fourth column in Table 3. 
Comparing these average costs to the expected benefits by level of education provides a crude 
sense of variation in actuarial unfairness.  The expected increase in DI benefit receipts is much 
higher for less educated families due to a likelihood of receipt that is nearly eight times as great 
as for the most educated families.  The benefit increase provides an additional dollar to these 
families at a price of only 32 cents.  All other families pay more than one dollar, with the 
college-educated paying over seven dollars.  Clearly, DI is not a particularly "good deal" for the 
typical individual with more than a high school education.  
4.3 Life-Cycle Incidence for Average Workers 
In this section, we convert the changes in family income to changes in individual utility to 
evaluate the net welfare impact of the increase in DI benefits.  Before converting the dollar 
values to utils, we first summarize the changes in family income in Table 4.  The first three 
columns of Table 4 present average pre-reform income for individuals classified by three point-
in-time family types: families with no DI beneficiary, families with a working aged DI 
beneficiary, and families with an elderly DI beneficiary.  The six rows are based on three 
concepts of income: family income, per capita income, and per capita income adjusted for 
economies of scale and for the number of adults and children in the family.  Each of these three 
measures is presented unsmoothed and smoothed to account for the relationship between 
concurrent family income and consumption. 
Baseline unadjusted family after-tax income is larger for individuals in families with no DI 
beneficiary ($28,455) than for those in families with either a worker beneficiary ($22,302) or an 
elderly beneficiary ($21,655).  However, the gap narrows when family income is smoothed.  The   25
difference between families with and without beneficiaries becomes even smaller when income 
is expressed in per capita terms.  In fact, the average income for individuals in families with an 
elderly DI beneficiary is larger than that for families with no limited individuals for three of the 
four per capita measures.   
The next three columns of Table 4 show the post-reform change in the various measures of 
income.  As expected, individuals in families with no beneficiary face income losses while 
individuals in families with either a working aged or elderly beneficiary experience increases in 
income.  The initial level of income and the change in income determine the measured impact on 
the financial component of utility for each individual. 
Table 5 shows changes in social welfare for different levels of risk aversion and different 
measures of individual income.  The first column indicates the value of the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion (θ ).  The next four columns show the average change in utility for individuals in the 
three different types of families and in all families.  For ease of interpretation, the changes in 
utility are expressed in monetary terms.  Specifically, the values shown are the average change in 
utility divided by the average pre-reform marginal value of $1 for individuals within each 
sample.  
Recall that social welfare is calculated using a utility function that exhibits constant relative 
risk aversion of the form shown in equation (1).  If individuals are risk neutral (θ  equal to zero), 
utility is simply measured by individual income.  Since our reform throws away 50 cents for 
every dollar transferred to beneficiaries, there must be a net loss in welfare under risk neutrality.  
What becomes clear from the results presented in Table 5 is that the policy reform leads to a net 
welfare loss for larger values of θ  as well.  
The pattern of net welfare impacts (as normalized by the relevant average pre-reform utility)   26
across levels of risk aversion in Table 5 is surprising.  The net welfare loss at first shrinks and 
then becomes larger as the level of risk aversion increases.  It appears that a representative 
individual from behind the "veil of ignorance" would be less willing to pay for higher disability 
benefits when very risk averse.  This is counterintuitive, since at higher levels of risk aversion 
the insurance motive should become more important and we would expect the policy reform to 
become more attractive. 
For the welfare of a given individual to fall as the level of benefits rises, the individual must 
not want to transfer resources from able-bodied to disabled (and on DI) states of the world.  This 
will be true so long as replacement rates are sufficiently high for the individual to be unwilling to 
pay for the increase.  Since DI payments are a function of average earnings, they will tend to be 
high (and may even be above 1) during periods when earnings are low – either early in a 
person’s working life or during prolonged negative earnings shocks that are not associated with 
disability.  Given the progressivity of the benefit formula, replacement rates will also be high for 
low income workers.  What happens in our calculations as the level of risk aversion is raised is 
that the marginal value of a dollar in low income states rises.  Within individuals, more weight is 
put on low income periods of time.  Across individuals, more weight is put on the low income 
households with generous replacement rates.  Together these two factors lead to the pattern of 
results we see. 
Table 6 shows how the net welfare impact varies for more and less well-educated individuals 
at different levels of risk aversion.
 35  The entries are comparable to the numbers in the final 
panel and last column of Table 5.  They represent the average change in utility, normalized by 
average baseline utility, associated with the reform.  These results again stress the redistributive 
                                                 
35 Tables 6, 7, and 8 present results for per capita family income adjusted for economies of scale and the number of 
adults and children as described above.  Results for pure per capita income do not differ qualitatively.    27
component of the DI program.  For all individuals with a high school education or greater, at all 
levels of risk aversion, the policy change causes a loss in net welfare.  For individuals with less 
than a high school diploma, there is a net welfare gain—for all but the highest level of risk 
aversion.  Again, while the price is favorable on average for individuals with low education due 
to moderate moral hazard costs and redistribution from the more highly educated, the gain turns 
negative at high levels of risk aversion due to redistribution from low to modest income states of 
the world for a sufficient number of individuals within the low education sample. 
The results shown in Table 7 isolate the role of the redistribution built into the financing of 
the DI program.  We set the indirect costs to zero, so that the only costs associated with the 
reform are the direct costs.  This implies no behavioral responses to the policy change, and 
therefore an average implicit price of additional insurance of one.  Under risk neutrality, those 
with a high school degree or less have expected increases in income while those with some 
college or more have expected decreases.  The average net benefit is negative at all levels of risk 
aversion for the more highly educated and, as above, turns negative at higher levels of risk 
aversion for the less educated groups.  The general similarity of the results between Tables 6 and 
7 highlights the fact that the reason we are finding payment increases do not increase welfare has 
more to do with the fact that in a sufficient number of cases such increases involve transfers from 
lower income states of the world rather than any moral hazard considerations. 
4.4 Incorporating Health Insurance 
  We first incorporate health insurance on the cost side.  Marginal applicants that shift to public 
health insurance coverage post-application are estimated to generate additional indirect costs of 
$45.3 million.  This raises the average implicit price of an additional dollar of insurance by 
10.7%, from $1.50 to $1.66.  This increase is not great enough to affect many of our conclusions   28
based on representative agents.  
Despite the moderate change in total costs that must be distributed, incorporating health 
insurance could have a potentially important effect on the average welfare analysis.  Recall that 
we incorporate the value of medical insurance by modifying after-tax income by a draw from 
distributions of out-of-pocket medical costs specific to insurance status.  As the figures in 
Appendix D show, health insurance status in the cross-section is largely a proxy for 
heterogeneity in health.  Out-of-pocket expenditures are consistently highest for the group 
covered by Medicare, which for younger households consists of disabled individuals.  
Expenditures are actually lowest for the uninsured.  Therefore, our adjustment will tend to make 
DI families appear relatively worse off in the baseline and would be expected to make the reform 
more attractive.   
Table 8 shows the average welfare impact by education status when the additional health 
insurance costs are distributed across the population and baseline utility is adjusted to account for 
insurance.  For all but the highest education group, the average change in utility due to the policy 
reform steadily rises with the level of risk aversion.  Once it is recognized that disabled 
individuals have lower disposable income than non-disabled individuals with the same level of 
family income due to their higher medical expenses, the consumption floor provided by DI is 
low enough that the perverse effect from taxing low-income disadvantaged workers to finance 
the transfers no longer shows up.  Though those with a high school degree or more continue to 
be made worse off on average by an increase in payment generosity, the net impact for all 
individuals combined is positive at moderate levels of risk aversion. 
Under this modification to our approach, the basic conclusion for whether the program is too 
generous or not is reversed.  We can use a back-of-the-envelope calculation to determine by how   29
much incorporating medical insurance has changed the effective replacement rate for after-tax 
family income.  According to our CEX estimates, average out-of-pocket medical expenses are 
14.2% of income for families with DI beneficiaries, compared to 6.2% for other families.  If the 
8 percentage point difference were simply attributable to the onset of disability (likely an upper 
bound), this would imply that after-tax replacement rates fall by nearly 8%.  The fact that these 
relatively small changes in program generosity and positioning within the income distribution 
alter our conclusions suggests that the level may not be too far from what would be optimal 
holding all other program parameters constant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We develop three basic insights into the desirability of increasing DI benefits from our 
baseline analysis.  First, while the indirect costs of benefit increases appear substantial, the value 
attached to such increases for the typical worker is also substantial.  Given our estimated average 
implicit price of $1.50, representative workers of all education levels should be willing to 
purchase an additional $1 of disability insurance under moderate levels of risk aversion.  Second, 
while the moral hazard costs appear to be relatively low, the implicit price of additional 
insurance can be quite large for some subgroups of the population due to redistribution.  The 
implicit price of an additional dollar varies from less than $1 for individuals with less than a high 
school degree to more than $7 for individuals with a college degree.  While the importance of 
redistribution across broad education categories has not been previously quantified, this pattern 
in implicit prices is not surprising given differences in the incidence of disability. 
Our final conclusion is the least acknowledged and perhaps most surprising.  We find that an 
increase in benefits leads to transfers from lower income individuals and states of the world to   30
individuals and states with more moderate income, such that these transfers lead to net welfare 
losses at high levels of risk aversion.  From an individual insurance perspective, a marginal 
increase in DI benefits is less attractive because of this potential redistribution to bad states from 
worse states.  From a social perspective, inequality aversion also plays a role.  This highlights 
that DI treats disability as a more "deserving" cause of low income than other negative shocks 
that affect able-bodied individuals, and that the disabled are treated as more deserving than the 
non-disabled poor.  The incompleteness of the safety net could to lead to similar counterintuitive 
findings for analyses of the adequacy of other categorical social insurance programs as well. 
Though our initial finding is that individuals are, if anything, over-insured against the subset 
of career-ending disabilities covered by DI, it is important to remember that we are evaluating a 
marginal change in benefit generosity.  These results are derived in the context of a program that 
provides generous benefits to low income workers who qualify.  Our estimates of willingness to 
pay make it clear that individuals would/should place a high value on the existence of the 
program.  Thus, an analysis that began from a base of less generous replacement rates would be 
expected to reach different conclusions.  The fact that we do indeed reach the opposite 
conclusion about the adequacy of the income security provided by DI under the alternative 
model that incorporates health insurance, which alters effective replacement rates, highlights this 
point.  Though our tools do not allow us to say much about the optimal level of DI benefits, this 
sensitivity of our results may imply that the current level is in the neighborhood of what would 
be conditionally optimal. 
 Appendix A: Implementation in the CPS 
A.1 Identifying current beneficiaries 
Since the CPS does not explicitly identify which individuals are DI recipients, we need to 
impute DI beneficiary status.  This is fairly straightforward for the working aged population.  We 
assume that individuals aged 21 to 61 who report having a work limitation and who receive 
Social Security benefits are receiving those benefits on the basis of their disability.  This 
imputation appears to be fairly accurate, capturing over 96% of the number of recipients reported 
in the Social Security Bulletin administrative data for 1990.
36  Table A1 summarizes the 
characteristics of DI beneficiaries relative to working aged individuals.  For both men and 
women, DI beneficiaries are over 50% more likely to be Black than other working aged 
individuals, and tend to be older and have lower levels of education.  These types of 
demographic differences are important factors in the redistribution that exists within the DI 
program. 
The process of identifying current beneficiaries is more difficult for individuals over the age 
of 61.  We would like to identify those who were receiving DI benefits during their working 
years, before the disability and retirement programs merge.  However, for those over 61, it is 
impossible to distinguish Social Security Disability Income from Social Security retirement 
income.  In addition, since self-reported disability rates increase with age, they cannot be used 
effectively to determine which individuals were DI beneficiaries during their working years.  
Rather than identify a subset of elderly individuals as DI beneficiaries with certainty, we impute 
the probability that each elderly individual would have been a DI beneficiary by assuming that 
elderly DI beneficiaries are similar to the younger working aged beneficiaries already identified. 
                                                 
36 The Bulletin documents 2,479,270 worker beneficiaries aged 21-61 in 1990.  Weighting the count of imputed 
beneficiaries by the CPS person weight yields an estimate of 2,387,258.   
In order to calculate this probability, we relate whether individuals aged 51-61 are worker 
beneficiaries to their individual characteristics, using a logit specification run separately by 
gender.  Results from these regressions can be found in the first two columns in Table A2.  We 
then use the coefficients from these regressions to predict the probability that individuals aged 62 
and over are DI recipients, calculated by setting their age to 61.  Any individual who does not 
report Social Security income is assumed to have a zero probability of DI receipt.
37  Assuming 
similar mortality rates across disabled and non-disabled individuals, the probabilities are rescaled 
proportionately so that the fraction of the population imputed to be DI recipients at any age over 
61 is the same as the fraction at age 61 (7.6% for males and 6.5% for females).
38  Of the 22,966 
individuals in our sample over the age of 61, 14,842 are assigned a non-zero probability of being 
a DI beneficiary.  Summary statistics for the elderly population as a whole and for imputed 
beneficiaries are found in Table A3. 
Since family DI payment amounts are poorly reported in the CPS, we estimate these amounts 
for both types of current beneficiaries.  All working aged beneficiaries in our sample receive DI 
benefits on their own account (that is, due to their own disability and work history), so we 
impute family benefits for them based on the reported level of worker benefits and the rules 
followed by the Social Security system.  Our methodology yields an estimated total of $13.8 
billion in DI benefits, as compared with the value of $17.3 billion determined from the 
administrative data reported by the Social Security Bulletin.  To account for the apparent 
                                                 
37 If a family has more than one elderly individual, we assume that only the individual with the highest predicted 
probability has a non-zero probability of being a DI recipient.  We assign the probability that either is a DI recipient 
to this individual. 
38 In fact, mortality rates among DI beneficiaries tend to be higher than mortality rates among the newly retired.  
Thus, our assumption is likely to exaggerate the fraction of the elderly who would have been DI recipients.  
Calculations using existing estimates of the mortality rate among DI beneficiaries suggest the magnitude of this 
effect is small.  
underreporting in the CPS, we scale reported benefits by a factor of 1.25.
39 
All elderly individuals assigned a positive probability of being a DI beneficiary report 
receiving Social Security income.  However, only some fraction is receiving benefits due to own 
work history.  We use data on marital history, relative earnings, and gender to determine which 
individuals are likely to fall into this category.  For these individuals, we impute family DI 
benefits based on reported Social Security benefits.
40 
A.2 Identifying Marginal Applicants  
We rely on strong assumptions to identify those who would be induced to apply under the 
new regime.  Among working aged individuals, we assume that the pool of potential applicants 
consists of all persons who self-report having disability-related work limitations but who are not 
identified as current DI beneficiaries.
41  The last column for men and women in Table A1 
presents summary statistics for these individuals.  Among elderly individuals, we assume that the 
pool of potential applicants is the same as the pool of individuals imputed to have a non-zero 
probability of having been DI beneficiaries. 
Following the regime change, each potential applicant may follow one of three paths.  They 
may choose not to apply for DI, they may apply and be accepted to the program, or they may 
                                                 
39 The undercount of Social Security benefits in the CPS appears to affect all age levels.  An equivalent scaling 
factor derived for the population aged 62 and over is equal to 1.21.  Due to the similarity of the implied scaling 
factors, we apply the working aged scaling factor to all Social Security benefits for consistency. 
40 For those elderly who were awarded DI benefits, the DI benefit formula is used to calculate their benefit level 
instead of the retirement formula.  However, without detailed work histories for these individuals, we are unable to 
use these formulas to calculate a true level of benefits under each program.  Instead, we assume both DI and 
retirement benefits to be equal to reported Social Security benefits for those determined to be receiving benefits on 
their own account. 
41 We assume that those who do not report a limitation in the baseline are not in the pool of potential applicants.  
This ignores the possibility that self-reported disability might respond to changes in the parameters of DI.  Previous 
work has suggested that the fraction of the working aged population identifying themselves as unable to work is 
quite sensitive to the availability and generosity of disability benefits, but that the fraction identifying themselves as 
in some way limited in their capacity for work is much less sensitive to such factors (Waidmann et al 1995). 
We exclude limited individuals who report SSI receipt since these individuals would have had to have passed the 
same screening used for DI recipients and must have been determined to be ineligible for DI due to inadequate work 
history.  While true in general, this ignores the possibility that some SSI recipients are in the process of applying for  
apply but be rejected.  Each of these scenarios involves different indirect costs associated with 
changes in benefit outlays, labor supply, transfers, and tax payments.  Rather than attribute a 
specific path to each individual within the potential applicant pool, we assign individuals a 
probability of each of these three outcomes. 
In order to predict the likelihood of each of these three scenarios, we first must determine how 
many individuals will be induced to apply by the increase in DI benefit generosity, and how 
many of those applications will be successful.  As described in the text, we assume that a 1% 
increase in benefits leads to a 0.5% increase in applications and that the steady state number of 
applicants is approximately double the number of recipients.  Given these assumptions, the 
average probability that a limited working aged individual applies in response to a 1% increase 
in benefits is .01× .5× (2× D)/L, where D is the number of current beneficiaries and L is the 
number of limited non-beneficiaries.  To account for individual differences in this proclivity 
across individuals, we adjust the above probability using information on the likelihood that 
limited individuals with differing observable characteristics are on DI.
42  The resulting estimates 
of the probability of applying rely on the assumption that marginal applicants are observably 
similar to current recipients. 
For elderly individuals, the probability of applying is derived directly from the imputed 
likelihood that the individual is a current DI beneficiary.  We scale the probability that an elderly 
individual is a current DI beneficiary by .01× .5× 2 to take into account the magnitude of the 
benefit increase, the application elasticity, and the likelihood of acceptance. 
With estimates of the likelihood that an individual is induced to apply on hand, we derive the 
                                                                                                                                                             
DI. 
42 We multiply the average probability by a term that is equal to that individual's predicted likelihood of being on DI 
relative to the average probability among the limited non-recipient population.  This term is derived from the results  
likelihood of each outcome for a potential applicant.  If we define the probability that an 
applicant applies as ai, then, given our assumption that half are accepted, the probabilities of 
applying and being accepted and of applying and being rejected are both equal to .5× ai.  The 
likelihood of not applying is simply (1-ai). 
In the event the application is successful, the person is eligible to receive some amount of DI 
payments.  Since the CPS does not include earnings histories, we need to predict the level of 
payments these individuals receive.  We regress actual log payments to current working-aged 
beneficiaries on their individual characteristics by gender (regression results can be found in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table A2), and then use the resulting coefficients to predict individual 
payments for our marginal working aged applicants.  We then use the program rules to simulate 
family benefits.  For elderly potential applicants, we use the same calculation as for elderly 
potential recipients, which ignores changes in benefit payments that would result from altered 
work histories. 
                                                                                                                                                             


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Appendix B: The Impact of Applying to DI 
In order to identify the impact of successful and unsuccessful applications for DI 
benefits, we combine information on individuals who are observed in the SIPP either at 
some point before applying, during the application process, or at some point after to 
create a pseudo panel.  Our regression framework allows us to track changes in key 
variables around the time of initial application relative to a control group of similar 
individuals with work limitations who never apply.  Our approach will, if anything, tend 
to overstate the causal impact of application since some of the change is likely due to the 
onset of disability.  The data and specification used in these regressions are discussed in 
the next two sections.  In the third and fourth sections, we discuss the results and how the 
behavioral responses are incorporated in our simulations.   
B.1 Data 
The Surveys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) are a series of United States 
Census panel surveys of representative populations of the United States.  New panels 
were fielded in 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993.
43  For the 1990 SIPP panel, the Census 
interviewed a new rotation group each month for four months starting in February 1990.  
These groups were interviewed eight times at four-month intervals.  Each interview 
contains monthly information for the preceding four months.  Hence, the 1990 SIPP 
panel provides monthly data for up to 32 months on each individual covering a 35-month 
period from October 1989 through August 1992.  The 1991 SIPP panel was fielded using 
the same panel design, and in 1992 and 1993 a similar design including an additional 
ninth wave of interviews was used to provide a total of 36 months of data.  
We match the 1990-1993 SIPP panels to the Social Security disability determination 
records.  The records are from Disability Determination Service (DDS) and 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) stages of the determination process for those who 
applied for DI benefits.  We have information for individuals whose applications were 
acted upon between 1986 and 1994 for the 1990 and 1991 panels and between 1977 and 
1997 for the 1992 and 1993 panels.
44  We use only those administrative records that 
begin with an initial consideration or reconsideration by the DDS and contain valid date 
of birth, filing date, and decision date information.  The matching procedure produced a 
total of 5,594 SIPP respondents who are identified as having applied for DI, with the bulk 
of the applications occurring during the late 1980s and 1990s. 
In what follows, we consider only the first application date observed in the 
administrative records for each respondent, and we consider only the final decision 
observed for that application.  Thus, a respondent who is initially denied benefits but is 
awarded benefits at a later stage of the same application process will be referred to as 
having been awarded benefits.  A respondent who is denied benefits, then later re-applies 
and is awarded benefits as a result of the later application, will be referred to as having 
been denied benefits. 
In our analysis, we merge our four SIPP panels but do not do so along a calendar time 
dimension.  Instead, we focus on an event—initial application month and year for DI 
benefits—and array our respondent panel data by individual from the months prior to 
application () tk − through the months following application () tk + , where t is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 New SIPP panels were fielded in earlier and later years but not all of these data have 
been matched to Social Security Administration administrative records.  
44 These data are essentially the same as those used by Lahiri, Vaughan and Wixon (1995) and Hu, Lahiri, 
Vaughan and Wixon (1997) in their work studying applications to the DI and SSI programs.  
month of application.  For those who applied for benefits prior to or in the early waves of 
the SIPP, we have information on their household income following application.  For 
those who applied for benefits in a middle wave, we have information on their household 
income in the months just prior to application and just following application.  For those 
who applied for benefits in the later waves of the SIPP or just afterwards, we have 
information on their household income in the months prior to application.  Using this 
approach, we are able to obtain snapshots of respondents’ average household income in 
the months and years prior to and following their application for DI benefits that extend 
beyond the maximum of 36 months that any one respondent is followed in a given SIPP 
panel. 
We include a control group of SIPP respondents who report having experienced a 
work limitation, but whom we do not identify as having applied for federal disability 
benefits (either DI or SSI) at any time.  To ensure that we compare applicants to non-
applicants that have similar demographic characteristics, we assign weights to non-
applicants that correspond to the proportion of the DI applicant population within the 
relevant age, race, sex, martial status, and educational attainment cell.  There are 288 
separate cells in the underlying matrix, and the same number of applicants and non-
applicants are assigned to each cell when DI applicants are weighted using the given 
population weights and non-applicants are weighted using the newly defined weights. 
B.2 Empirical Specification 
We set up a regression model that allows us to estimate how a variety of income 
measures and indicators are affected by application.  We include fixed effects for each 
individual, i, and for each calendar month, t, in the sample period.  A set of indicator  
variables for months relative to application month is also included.  These variables 
(month zero, for example, representing the month of application, or month twelve, to take 
another example, representing the month one year subsequent to application) are equal to 
one if the observation of income data is taken from the month corresponding to the 
indicator variable, and zero otherwise.  Thus the equations have the form:  
it i t j ij ij
j
ym α γβ ε =++ + ∑ ,                   ( 1
B) 
where it y  represents monthly income (in January 1990 dollars), an indicator for positive 
income, or an indicator for insurance coverage for individual iin time period t, 
depending on the case.  The α ’s and the γ ’s represent applicant and calendar month 
fixed effects and the  ij m ’s represent the indicator variables for each month relative to the 
application month.  There is a separate indicator variable for each month representing 
data from 35 months before to 39 months after application.  Observations from 39 or 
more months prior to application or 40 or more months subsequent to application are 
excluded from the regression sample.  Therefore, the coefficients on application month 
indicator variables (the β ’s) can be interpreted as the average change from the level 
observed 36 to 38 months prior to application. 
Graphs in the figures that follow are constructed using estimated coefficients from 
regressions with the format given by equation (1
B).  For purposes of presentation, the 
β ’s are added to average baseline incomes (technically, the average α  for applicants).  
Thus, the graphs show average income from a particular source in each application 
month.  Since a control group is included in the regressions (and application month  
dummies will be identically zero for all individuals in the control group), the calendar 
month fixed effects remove time trends resulting from age or economy-wide trends. 
The time patterns for earnings, transfer receipts, and health insurance status are shown 
in Figures B1 through B6 for awarded and denied applicants separately by gender.  The 
graphs in the left panel of each figure correspond to successful applicants (“awarded”), 
and the right-hand side panel shows the results for unsuccessful applicants (“denied”).  
The y-axis shows the average value of the variable of interest and the x-axis indicates the 
number of months relative to the time of application, with a negative sign indicating 
months before application.  Each of the six figures is based on one of the following 
monthly measures: own earnings conditional on positive earnings, own labor force 
participation, spouse’s earnings (unconditional), other transfer income (excluding AFDC, 
Food Stamps, and SSI),
45 health insurance status, and public health insurance status. 
B.3 Earnings and Transfers 
In order to simulate the impact of successful and unsuccessful applications, we first 
use the regression results to predict how family income changes due to altered earnings 
and "other" transfer receipts.  We then directly model changes in eligibility through the 
AFDC, Food Stamp, and SSI programs using the benefit algorithms for 1990.  To 
determine changes in receipt, we rely on assumptions about post-application take-up for 
AFDC and SSI and apply SIPP-based estimates for the Food Stamp program.  Finally, we 
calculate changes in state and federal income and payroll taxes paid.  We address changes 
in public health insurance coverage in the next section. 
For successful applicants, the most important behavioral response is the reduction in 
own labor force participation.  While there is no clear trend in average earnings  
(conditional on working) in Figure B1, Figure B2 demonstrates that nearly all successful 
applicants leave the labor force permanently.  For this group, there is no evidence of a 
significant change in average spousal earnings (Figure B3).
46  Figure B4 shows that the 
same holds for other transfer income for males, though there is a small (but economically 
insignificant) increase for females. 
Therefore, to measure the public costs associated with successful applications, we first 
remove own earnings and add predicted DI benefits.  We then calculate changes in 
transfers through the three specific programs that are likely to be most important.  By 
definition, none of the marginal applicants were eligible for SSI prior to application since 
the screening process for the two programs is essentially the same.  For successful 
marginal applicants with income low enough to qualify them for SSI, we assume 100% 
take-up.  For both AFDC and Food Stamps, we observe baseline participation in the CPS 
and then predict eligibility post application.  For the Food Stamp program, we use the 
matched SIPP-SSA data to estimate average take-up among eligible awarded applicants 
more than one year after application (57.9%), and apply this estimate to randomly assign 
eligibles to the program.
47  The sample is too small to generate reliable estimates of take-
up for those eligible for AFDC, so we assume full take-up. 
Though labor force participation rates of unsuccessful applicants drop sharply prior to 
the month of application, participation rebounds somewhat over time (Figure B2).  For 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Other transfer income includes state and county short-term cash, transportation, and childcare assistance. 
46 While this appears to be inconsistent with our assumption that wives of current beneficiaries respond to 
the lump sum DI payment, application to DI involves competing changes in the value of leisure and in 
income that apparently generate a net zero response for spouses.  We report the results for unconditioned 
earnings since we are interested in the average effect on earnings for spouses and have less reason to expect 
the participation margin to be important. 
47 We assume that all baseline participants who continue to be eligible continue to receive Food Stamp 
benefits.  We then randomly determine which of the remaining eligible applicants receive Food Stamps to 
obtain the appropriate aggregate take-up rate.  
denied males, 31.8% as many are working by one year after application as were working 
one year before.  The same estimate for females is 49.9%.  These rates reflect monthly 
participation and could be consistent with some fraction returning to work full time and 
some fraction returning to work part time or intermittently.  In the absence of evidence on 
the appropriate combination, we assume the above fractions of denied applicants who are 
initially working in our sample return to work and that the remaining individuals leave 
the labor force.  The figure showing the pattern in earnings over time for denied 
applicants (Figure B1) suggests that denied applicants who return to work earn the same 
as before.  There is no evidence of a sizeable impact of application on either spousal 
labor supply or other transfers (Figures B3 and B4), so we ignore these.  Finally, these 
individuals will not be eligible for SSI, but we handle AFDC and Food Stamps in the 
same way as for successful applicants, except that we use the estimated post-application 
Food Stamps take-up rate specific to denied applicants (59.2%). 
B.4 Health Insurance Coverage 
The final two figures present the coefficients from regressions of health insurance 
coverage.  Figure B5 graphs the coefficients on the time-since-application dummies for 
any health insurance coverage, while Figure B6 graphs the same for any public health 
insurance coverage.  An individual is identified as having some form of public health 
insurance if the individual is covered by Medicare, Medicaid, CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, 
or military health care. 
Figures B5 and B6 show that successful applicants experience a dramatic increase in 
health insurance coverage driven by a nearly complete shift to Medicare, as would be 
expected since all are eligible after two years on the DI program.  Unsuccessful  
applicants do not experience a net change in insurance coverage, though the composition 
of coverage shifts somewhat toward public programs.  Relative to pre-application levels, 
public insurance coverage rates increase by 17.6 percentage points for females and 19.6 
percentage points for male by two years after application. 
Determining the net fiscal externality associated with these changes is very difficult.  
Even individuals who are insured through private plans may be receiving subsidies from 
other lower cost individuals covered by the same plan.  Similarly, individuals who are 
uninsured may impose costs on others through the system.  If there is a net subsidy 
through health insurance or uncompensated health care prior to application, then the 
effective increase in the financial burden on others from any shifts to Medicare or 
Medicaid following application will be lower than the amount of new public outlays. 
The evidence suggests that that there are sizeable subsidies through these other 
channels.  Among workers, there appears to be some shifting of relative health care costs 
through reduced wages according to demographic characteristics such as age (e.g. Gruber 
1994).  However, there is likely to be limited wage offset according to health status 
(Currie and Madrian 1999).  If so, privately insured marginal applicants, who are likely to 
be of poorer than average health, receive a subsidy equal to the difference between their 
medical costs and the average for workers within their age, and perhaps gender, group.  
While there is limited evidence regarding subsidies for the uninsured, recent estimates 
find that the typical uninsured individual pays only about one-third of the cost of received 
care (Pauly and Herring 2001). 
We choose an approach that provides a clear upper bound on the new public health 
insurance costs associated with marginal applicants.  We assume that all individuals that  
were not receiving public insurance prior to applying but then shift to public insurance 
generate net new health care costs.  Since the average ratio of Medicare payments to DI 
family payments is 0.475,
48 we scale the value of DI benefits to successful applicants 
who were not initially publicly insured by 1.475 to incorporate Medicare costs.  We 
assume that the fractions of denied applicants estimated to be newly covered by public 
health insurance generate new costs equal to per capita Medicaid expenditures in 1990 
($6595). 
 
                                                 
48 The Social Security Bulletin (1991) reports that total annual Medicare spending for DI beneficiaries was 
$11,239 million in 1990.  In that same year, monthly payments to DI worker beneficiaries, their spouses, 
and children were $1,768 million, $40 million, and $162 million, respectively.  
Figure B1. Applicant's Earnings (Conditional on Reporting Positive Earnings) 
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Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





DI applicants denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE






Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Male DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Female DI, awarded  
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Female DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Figure B2. Applicant's Labor Force Participation 
 
Fraction Positive Own Earnings
DI applicants awarded 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE




Fraction Positive Own Earnings
DI applicants denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE




Fraction Positive Own Earnings
Male DI, awarded
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE




Fraction Positive Own Earnings
Male DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE




Fraction Positive Own Earnings
Female DI, awarded  
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE




Fraction Positive Own Earnings
Female DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Figure B3. Applicant's Spouse's Earnings (Unconditional) 
 
Spouse's Earnings
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Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE






Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Male DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Female DI, awarded  
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Female DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE






Figure B4. Applicant's Transfer Income Excluding AFDC, Food Stamps, and SSI 
 
Other Transfer Income
DI applicants awarded 
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Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE






Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Male DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Female DI, awarded  
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Female DI, denied 
Minus 1.96 SE  Plus 1.96 SE





Figure B5. Applicant's Health Insurance Status 
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Male DI, denied 
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Female DI, awarded  
 Plus 1.96 SE Minus 1.96 SE









Female DI, denied 
Plus 1.96 SE Minus 1.96 SE














Figure B6. Applicant's Public Health Insurance Status  
 
Any Public Health Insurance
DI applicants awarded 
 Plus 1.96 SE Minus 1.96 SE








Any Public Health Insurance
DI applicants denied 
Plus 1.96 SE Minus 1.96 SE









Any Public Health Insurance
Male DI, awarded
 Plus 1.96 SE Minus 1.96 SE








Any Public Health Insurance
Male DI, denied 
Plus 1.96 SE Minus 1.96 SE









Any Public Health Insurance
Female DI, awarded  
 Plus 1.96 SE  Minus 1.96 SE








Any Public Health Insurance
Female DI, denied 
 Plus 1.96 SE  Minus 1.96 SE









Appendix C: Predicting Family Consumption 
We would like to account for the fact that variation in the distribution of income 
overstates variation in consumption since households can use savings and other means to 
smooth transitory shocks to income.  Therefore, we estimate the relationship between 
consumption and income from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX).  We then use this relationship to adjust family income in the CPS. 
C.1 Data 
The CEX interviews approximately 5,000 households every quarter on a rotating 
basis.  Households are interviewed for four consecutive quarters and then dropped from 
the sample.  Each quarter, households provide detailed reports on expenditures by 
category for the prior three months.  Information on income for the prior year, which 
coincides with the timing of annual consumption, is gathered in the final interview.   
We use the family-level extracts compiled by Harris and Sabelhaus (2000).  In order to 
provide a ten-year window around 1990, we include households interviewed from the 
first quarter of 1985 through the last quarter of 1995.  We restrict the sample to the subset 
of 40,848 households that provide complete income reports and remain in the sample for 
a full year.  Weights are provided that adjust the national CEX weights to account for 
attrition by age and housing tenure.  We use these adjusted weights in our analyses. 
Our income measure is calculated to match after-tax income in the CPS as closely as 
possible.  It includes all components of earned and unearned income (including Food 
Stamp benefits) except for payments to employees in-kind and insurance refunds, which 
are not available in the CPS.  For the same reason, we do not subtract alimony or child  
support payments made by the household.  After-tax income is pre-tax income less 
reported federal and state income and payroll taxes paid. 
Our total consumption measure is comprehensive and includes expenditures on the 
following categories of goods and services: food, tobacco, alcohol, clothing, personal 
care, medical, recreation, education, household, utilities, personal business, vehicles, 
transportation, and non-mortgage interest payments.  We include rent paid for renters and 
home rental equivalent value for homeowners (and exclude home maintenance and 
financial costs). 
Both income and consumption are converted to 1990 dollars using the CPI for all 
goods.  Mean annual after-tax income in the CEX sample is $27,930 (with a standard 
error of $110), which is somewhat higher than the mean for our CPS sample ($23,597 
($70)).  This difference can at least be partly explained by the fact that the CEX family-
level data corresponds to more expansive household units than our CPS family-level data.  
Mean annual consumption in the CEX sample is $25,715 ($81). 
C.2 Predicting Consumption 
Our specification relates the natural logarithm of consumption to the natural logarithm 
of income and a constant term.  We replace income to $1 if income is less than $1 and 
also include an indicator for these low-income households.  We allow for heterogeneity 
in the relationship between consumption and income by age and disability status.  We 
split households into three categories according to age of the household head: less than 45 
years, 45-61 years, and 62 years and over.  For the two non-elderly groups, we split the 
sample further into households with and without a disabled working-aged individual.
49 
                                                 
49 Households with working-aged disabled members are identified as households that either report SSI 
receipts or have no member over 61 years of age and report receiving Social Security income.  
We began with a specification that allowed for a full set of interactions between the 
other control variables and indicators for each demographic group.  We could not reject 
the hypothesis that the slopes were the same across these five groups.  While the 
coefficients on the low-income indicator were significantly different from one another for 
the groups that had low-income individuals, not all of our groups were represented.  
Therefore, the specification that we implement constrains the coefficient on log income 
and the coefficient on the low-income indicator to be the same across groups, and 
includes separate constant terms for each group. 
The ordinary least squares results from this specification are shown below: 










 Constant    5.141  0.061   
  Ln(annual after-tax income)    0.486  0.006   
  Indicator for income less than $1    5.376  0.084   
  Head under 45 years of age         
     No working-aged disabled in CU  51.0%  -  -   
     Working-aged disabled member  2.5%  -0.131  0.019   
  Head between 45 and 61 years of age         
     No working-aged disabled in CU  20.8%  0.074  0.007   
     Working-aged disabled member  2.4%  -0.082  0.018   
  Head aged 62+  23.3%  -0.036  0.007   
 
The dependent variable is log consumption and the omitted demographic category is 
household head under 45 with no working-aged disabled members.  The regression is 
weighted using the adjusted weight.  The number of observations is 40,848 and the 
adjusted R-squared is 0.494. 
The coefficient on log income is surprisingly low, a robust finding that is not an 
artifact of pooling the sample.  There is certainly a great deal of measurement error in 
income in the CEX that would lead to a downward bias in the estimated income  
elasticity.  As long as measurement error in the CPS is similar to that in the CEX, then 
this prediction is still useful for our purposes.  It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that applying these estimates to predict consumption in the CPS likely leads to an overly 
narrow distribution.  One other finding that is worth noting is that disabled households 
apparently consume less than non-disabled households with the same income. 
In order to predict consumption for our CPS sample, we apply the estimated 
coefficients shown in Table B1.  However, we first make one adjustment.  Since we 
conduct welfare analyses both for income and for consumption ("smoothed" income), we 
want to ensure that any differences in the inferences are not driven by differences in 
mean levels.  We, therefore, redefine the constant term to equate mean income and mean 
predicted consumption.  
Appendix D: Estimating Out-of-pocket Medical Expenditures 
We model the role of health insurance in our welfare calculations through its impact 
on the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditures.  In this appendix, we describe how we 
estimate this distribution for different demographic groups by insurance status. 
D.1 Data 
We rely on the same CEX extracts that are described in Appendix C.  We combine 
these data with additional data on health insurance status from the detailed expenditure 
files on hospitalization and health insurance included in the CEX since the first quarter of 
1988.  From these files, we are able to identify whether any members in the household 
are covered by private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and/or another program that 
provides free health care (e.g. CHAMPUS or military health care).  To match these 
quarterly data on insurance status to the annual income files, we identify a household as 
covered by one of these plans if any member was covered at any point during the year.  
Restricting the sample to households that are complete income reporters and remain in 
the sample for a full year, the analysis sample includes 28,718 households interviewed 
between the first quarter of 1988 and the last quarter of 1995. 
D.2 Methodology 
We use the empirical distributions of out-of-pocket health care expenditures in the 
CEX to randomly reduce income for households in the CPS.  We estimate the distribution 
separately for households with heads under 45 years, between 45 and 61 years, and over 
62 years of age.  We further distinguish among households within these groups by four 
mutually exclusive classes of insurance coverage: no insurance (12.2%), private 
insurance only (52.6%), Medicare (22.8%), and Medicaid or any other free care program  
(12.4%).  The Medicare category may include individuals covered by supplementary 
private insurance plans.  The Medicaid category includes any household covered by 
Medicaid, including households that are also covered by Medicare or private insurance. 
Health care expenditures include expenditures on medical goods and services, as well 
as payments for health insurance premiums and copayments.  We calculate the income 
share of health care expenditures by taking the ratio of expenditures to after-tax income, 
as calculated in Appendix C.  For each of our three age groups by the four insurance 
statuses, we then identify the percentiles of the distribution of the income share (for every 
two percentiles from the 2
nd to the 98
th) for each of our three demographic groups by the 
four insurance statuses.  The data are weighted by the adjusted household weight for 
these calculations. 
Each household in the CPS sample is then randomly assigned the out-of-pocket 
income share associated with one of the percentiles of the distribution that is appropriate 
to them.  For the welfare calculations, we subtract from (or add to) household income the 
difference between the assigned health care expenditures and overall average health care 
expenditures.  The empirical distributions from the CEX are shown in the following 
figures. 
 
  Figure D1. Income Share of Out-of-pocket Health Care Expenditures for 
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Figure D2. Income Share of Out-of-pocket Health Care Expenditures for 
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Figure D3. Income Share of Out-of-pocket Health Care Expenditures for 
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Table 1. Summary of the Costs of the Policy Reform 
 Millions  of 
Dollars 
   
Net transfer to current DI recipients (static costs)  286.3 
   
Increased DI payments to worker beneficiaries  191.1 
Increased DI payments to elderly beneficiaries  129.6 
Decreased SSI payments to current beneficiaries  (28.9) 
Decreased Food Stamp benefits to current beneficiaries  (0.9) 
Increase in federal taxes paid by current beneficiaries  (4.1) 
Increase in state taxes paid by current beneficiaries  (0.5) 
   
Costs associated with behavioral response (dynamic costs)  143.0 
   
DI payments to successful new applicants  89.7 
Expected costs due to changes in taxes paid  53.1 
     Decrease in federal taxes paid due to spousal labor supply response  1.1 
     Decrease in state taxes paid due to spousal labor supply response  0.2 
     Decrease in payroll taxes paid due to spousal labor supply response  0.9 
     Decrease in federal taxes paid by marginal applicants  22.5 
     Decrease in state taxes paid by marginal applicants  5.2 
     Decrease in payroll taxes paid by marginal applicants  23.2 
Expected transfer costs (due to marginal applicants)  0.2 
     Change in SSI payments  0.3 
     Change in Food Stamp benefits  0.4 
     Change in AFDC payments  (0.5) 
   
 




Notes: The policy reform considered is a 1% increase in the generosity of DI benefits.  
The static costs are the calculated costs of financing the reform in the absence of 
behavioral responses.  The dynamic costs include costs arising due to behavioral 
responses of spouses of current beneficiaries and of individuals induced to apply to the 
program on the margin.  Note that the payroll tax costs include the employer share.  All 
costs are simulated using the March 1991 CPS.  The values in bold represent totals, and 
the values that are not in bold are subtotals.  Parentheses () are used to indicate cost 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5. Welfare Analysis 
  Average change in utility, divided by average marginal value of $1 









1) Individual Income = per capita family income, not smoothed 
0 -1.77  36.46  30.00  -0.59 
1 -1.68  48.08  32.88  -0.26 
2 -6.27  97.95  62.40  -3.34 
4  -2.06× 10
9  8478.14 27726.56  -1.99× 10
9 
 
2) Individual Income = per capita family income, smoothed 
0 -0.80  20.36  16.44  -0.15 
1 -0.82  23.35  15.97  -0.12 
2 -1.13  34.54  18.00  -0.20 
4 -372.57  221.05  55.53  -355.27 
 
3) Individual Income = adjusted per capita family income, not smoothed 
0 -2.39  45.29  35.58  -0.94 
1 -2.21  63.19  43.21  -0.34 
2 -7.28  131.36  91.95  -3.25 
4  -1.52× 10
9  13408.35 73299.58 -1.47× 10
9 
 
4) Individual Income = adjusted per capita family income, smoothed 
0 -1.05  24.23  19.26  -0.28 
1 -1.04  29.77  20.36  -0.16 
2 -1.22  41.38  24.13  -0.07 
4 -247.56  143.27  77.97  -235.45 
Notes: Each panel shows the results of the welfare analysis using a different measure of 
individual income.  The top two panels use unadjusted per capita income (µ=$11,260), while the 
bottom two are based on per capita income adjusted for economics of scale and the number of 
adults and children as described in the text (µ=$14,798).  The measure for after-tax family 
income that underlies the individual income measures in panels 2 and 4 is smoothed according to 
the relationship between after-tax income and consumption in the CEX.  With each panel, the 
rows present the results using the indicated relative risk aversion parameter value (θ ).  For each 
level of risk aversion, we show the average change in utility from before to after the reform for 
separate groups in the first three columns, as well as for all individuals in the last column.  The 
values are converted to dollar equivalents by dividing by the overall average marginal utility of 
$1.  
Table 6. Average Welfare Impact by Education Level 
  Level of Educational Attainment 










       
0 -0.28 
 
1.22 -0.28 -0.76 -1.19 
1 -0.16 
 
1.27 -0.23 -0.71 -1.18 
2 -0.07 
 
1.41 -0.22 -0.75 -1.33 
4 -235.45 
 
-381.80 -39.83 -409.85  -3.21 
Notes: The calculations of the net change in utility are based on smoothed and adjusted per 
capita after-tax family income (as in panel 4 in the prior table).  Positive values indicate that the 
net welfare impact of a 1% increase in DI benefit generosity is positive for the subgroup and 
level of risk aversion (θ ) indicated, while negative values indicate a net welfare loss.  The 
average change in utility for each group is converted to dollar equivalents by dividing by the 
average marginal value of $1 for the group.  
Table 7. Net Welfare Impact with no Factor Loading, by Education Level 
    Level of Educational Attainment 










       
0 
 
0.05 1.38 0.03 -0.39  -0.71 
1 
 
0.16 1.66 0.08 -0.34  -0.60 
2 
 
0.29 2.17 0.14 -0.32  -0.57 
4 
 
-173.39 -512.41  -35.00  -277.70  -1.00 
       
Implicit 
Price  1.00 0.22 1.02 1.96 4.62 
       
Notes: The calculations of the net change in utility are based on smoothed and adjusted per 
capita after-tax family income.  Positive values indicate that the net welfare impact of a 1% 
increase in DI benefit generosity is positive for the subgroup and level of risk aversion (θ ) 
indicated, while negative values indicate a net welfare loss.  The average change in utility for 
each group is converted to dollar equivalents by dividing by the average marginal value of $1 for 
the group.  Note that the results in this table ignore any costs arising from behavioral responses, 
and consider only the static or direct costs of the reform.  The last row shows implicit prices for 
an additional $1 of disability insurance.  The first column simply presents the ratio of overall 
total costs to the increase in income for current DI recipients, which is equal to one in the 
absence of behavioral responses.  The other columns show the implicit price for families with 
heads that have the indicated levels of education, constructed in the same way as the last column 
in Table 3.  These values are the average ratio of family costs to expected benefits in the case 




Table 8. Net Welfare Impact with Health Insurance, by Education Level 
    Level of Educational Attainment 










       
0 
 
-0.36 1.18 -0.34 -0.85 -1.32 
1 
 
-0.22 1.44 -0.29 -0.76 -1.11 
2 
 
-0.11 1.89 -0.28 -0.74 -1.04 
4 
 
0.38 4.34 -0.13  -0.70  -1.33 
       
Implicit 
Price  1.66 0.34 1.65 3.21 7.99 
         
Notes: The calculations of the net change in utility are based on smoothed and adjusted per 
capita after-tax family income.  Positive values indicate that the net welfare impact of a 1% 
increase in DI benefit generosity is positive for the subgroup and level of risk aversion (θ ) 
indicated, while negative values indicate a net welfare loss.  The average change in utility for 
each group is converted to dollar equivalents by dividing by the average marginal value of $1 for 
the group.  Note that the results in this table incorporate health insurance in two easy.  First, the 
total costs of the reform include any costs associated with shifts to public insurance among 
marginal applicants ($30.5 million in new Medicare costs and $14.8 million in new Medicaid 
costs).  Second, family income is randomly reduced to account for differences in medical outlays 
as described in Appendix D.  The last row shows implicit prices for an additional $1 of disability 
insurance.  The first column simply presents the ratio of overall total costs to the increase in 
income for current DI recipients.  The other columns show the implicit price for families with 
heads that have the indicated levels of education, constructed in the same way as the last column 
in Table 3.  These values are the average ratio of family costs to expected benefits when health 
insurance is incorporated in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 